Tendo como ponto de partida a obra de René Girard, o presente artigo pretende apresentar a dimensão antropológica presente na obra deste autor, destacando a sua originalidade e novidade ao pensar o homem como animal socialmente desejante. A teoria mimética, como Girard a formula, pretende ser uma teoria que, colocando no centro da sua reflexão o desejo e a imitação, permita compreender como se estruturam as sociedades arcaicas e actuais, partindo de mecanismos marcadamente antropológicos, para afirmar que as sociedades se (...) estruturam a partir do desejo, do sacrifício e da necessidade de existência de «bodes expiatórios». A partir deste pressuposto, o sacrifício é a primeira instituição humana, com a capacidade farmacológica de preservar a sociedade e de permitir a sua subsistência no tempo. A cultura, por seu lado, emerge a partir do desejo mimético; e o mecanismo do bode expiatório, mecanismo vitimário por excelência, regula a sociedade ao solucionar as suas tensões internas. Considerando estes três conceitos – sacrifício, desejo mimético e mecanismo do bode expiatório – este artigo expõe o modo como se relacionam estes conceitos. Apesar de constatar a sua presença e eficácia na história, Girard não os legitima de jure, desvelando o segredo da sua eficácia – a ignorância inocente das vítimas – que, paradoxalmente, persiste mesmo depois de denunciada nas suas escusas razões. Posto isto, perguntemo-nos: como proteger o homem da sua própria violência? (shrink)

O presente manuscrito apresenta relações de religiosidade e espiritualidade (R∕E) com diferentes indicadores sociais, educacionais e de saúde durante a Pandemia da COVID-19 no Brasil Particularmente, mostra que R∕E tem efeitos positivos nos indicadores de felicidade, bem-estar subjetivo, percepção de dor e nos diferentes índices de saúde mental. Conclui afirmando que a dimensão religiosidade e espiritualidade tem múltiplas facetas, embora seja ainda negligenciada no ensino e na pesquisa em saúde pública, especialmente em saúde mental.

The general aim of this very welcome volume is to explore the relation between pragmatism and neuroscience. The thirteen chapters are evenly divided into four parts, roughly organized around the themes of brain and pragmatism, emotion and cognition, creativity and education, and ethics.The beginning chapter written by the editors attempts to show that advances in behavioral and brain sciences intersect core theses of pragmatism with regards to cognition and the mind-world relation. The basic assumption is that neuroscience and pragmatism share (...) a naturalist program: pragmatism refers all philosophical explanation to experimental science and neuroscience explains all.. (shrink)

Neste artigo examina-se a situação dos NMRs. Utilizando dados da sua crescente proliferação na África, apresentam-se vários modelos teóricos, numa tentativa de elucidar o seu desenvolvimento. Dá-se uma atenção particular à questão de saber se esses modelos teóricos são culturalmente condicionados e são suficientes para uma compreensão global dos NMRs. /// Cet article examine la situation des Nouveaux Mouvements religieux. Utilisant des données de leur croissante prolifération en Afrique, l'auteur présente plusieurs modèles en un essai d'élucidation de leur développement. Il (...) fait particulièrement attention à la question de savoir sices modèles théoriques sont culturellement conditionnés et suffisants pour une compréhension globale des N.M.R. /// This article examines the situation of NMRs. Taking as example the development of NMRs in Africa, the author considers the contribution of various theoretical models, specifically deprivation, revitalisation and brainwashing theories. Particular attention is given to the question whether or not these models are culture specific and/or to whether or not they are applicable to the present development of NMRs. (shrink)

1. INTRODUCTIONIt has been some time now since the philosophical community has learned to appreciate Husserl’s contribution to the philosophies of logic, mathematics, and science in general, despite still some prejudices and misinterpretations in certain academic circles incapable of reading Husserl beyond the incompetent and malicious review which Frege wrote in 1894 of his Philosophie der Arithmetik (PA) [1891/2003], hereafter Hua XII.Husserl’s philosophy of mathematics, in particular, has been the subject of many articles and books and has attracted the attention (...) of many interpreters and philosophers who have found in Husserl fruitful ideas with which to tackle the many philosophical problems elicited by mathematics — its ontology, its epistemology, and its somehow surprising utility, even when not indispensable, in modern science. This original and interesting work by Professor Hartimo is a welcome addition to this already respectable bibliography. The book is essentially exegetical and presents a reading of Husserl’s philosophy, particularly his philosophy of mathematics, as found in some of his most important published works, which were reactions to the development of mathematics in his time, of which he was, as the mathematician he used to be, an attentive and well-informed observer. (shrink)

New Blackfriars, Volume 102, Issue 1100, Page 586-587, July 2021.

Procuramos apontar as implicações do pensamento pós-moderno para a Educação Física diante do contexto atual de mundialização do capital que vem provocando mudanças significativas no mundo do trabalho. A partir do materialismo histórico e dialético, analisamos o que propõe o pensamento pós-moderno e concluímos que tal pensamento não apresenta avanços no que se refere às necessidades históricas colocadas à Educação Física. Apontamos para a importância do marxismo como ferramenta para compreender os aspectos contraditórios que se apresentam na realidade e transformá-la (...) na direção de interesses coletivos. (shrink)

I present two criticisms: (1) Merge is a model of performance in speech perception experiments but not an ecologically valid model integrating both word recognition and speech perception, and (2) Merge's implementation of the variability of lexical effects must be made more precise or the model is indistinguishable from its alternatives.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Academic Skepticism in Early Modern PhilosophyJosé R. Maia NetoAncient skepticism was more influential in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than it had ever been before. Thanks to the groundwork of Charles B. Schmitt and Richard H. Popkin on the influence of ancient skepticism in early modern philosophy and to the extensive research that followed their lead, skepticism is now recognized as having played a major role in the rise (...) of modern thought. 1There were two ancient skeptical schools, Academic skepticism and Pyrrhon-ism. Were both equally influential? Until the sixteenth century, Pyrrhonism was scarcely known. Only a few copies of Sextus’s books (the only surviving primary source of ancient Pyrrhonism) have been discovered in medieval libraries. By contrast the main source of Academic skepticism, Cicero’s Aca-demica, was occasionally referred to by medieval authors and was the object of some commentaries and criticism in the Renaissance. 2 Academic skepticism was preserved from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance not only through Cicero’s Academica, but also through Lactantius’s Divinae Institutiones and [End Page 199] Augustine’s Contra Academicos. 3 This situation changed when Sextus’s works were translated to latin and published in 1562 and 1569. Sextus presents a much more complete and detailed account and defense of ancient skepticism than that of Cicero’s Academica. Sextus presents Pyrrhonism as a coherent form of skepticism and Academic skepticism as a kind of negative dogmatism. 4 It was thus natural that the ancient skepticism that fascinated some (and troubled so many) early modern thinkers was mostly Pyrrhonian. Because of the publication of Sextus’s works, according to Schmitt, the increasing influence of Cicero’s Academica in the Renaissance was halted. Sextus’s Hypotyposes and Adversus Mathematicos took the place of Cicero’s Academica and drastically increased the influence of ancient skepticism. 5 The skeptical crisis at the dawn of modern philosophy is called “pyrrhonienne” not “academicienne.”While the appearance of Sextus’s works in Latin turned him and Pyrrhonism into the main source and influence of ancient skepticism in early modern philosophy, further research on the history of skepticism in the period has shown that the role of Cicero’s Academica and of Academic skepticism in general continued to be considerable. First, Cicero’s works were important items in the university curricula. Although Cicero’s works of rhetoric and morals were those more read, the students could certainly learn about Academic skepticism through at least some of them. Second, many editions of De Natura Deorum, a work of Cicero’s in which Academic skepticism is quite central, were published during the seventeenth century. Third, features of Academic skepticism, exhibited above all in Cicero’s Academica, are basic to the skepticism revived in the late Renaissance by Montaigne and Charron; were related to the new science in the first half of the seventeenth century by Gassendi; were used in the anti-Cartesian reaction of the late seventeenth century by Rapin, Huet, Bayle, and above all Foucher; and were radicalized in the eighteenth century by Hume. Despite the Academic features of Montaigne’s, Charron’s, and Gassendi’s skepticisms, it does seem that from the publication of Sextus’s works to the mid-seventeenth century, Academic skepticism was secondary to Pyrrhonism. But the appearance of Descartes and the development of Cartesianism in the second half of the seventeenth century set conditions for a complete revamping of Academic skepticism, bringing about what Schmitt thought was precluded by the appearance of Sextus in the modern scene, namely, a “full flowering of the Academica as a work to inspire new directions of philosophical thought.” 6 [End Page 200]Montaigne’s Apologie pour Raimond Sebond is rightly considered the first major result of the revival of ancient Pyrrhonism in modern thought. 7 Montaigne never cites the name of Sextus nor acknowledges his source and, by contrast, fills his Apology with passages from Cicero on the Academic skeptics. It is clear, however, that Montaigne follows closely Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism in the central part of the Apology where he gives a detailed and sympathetic exposition of ancient skepticism.After dwelling on the evils and problems arising from knowledge and science, Montaigne... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume and Pascal: Pyrrhonism vs. Nature José R. Maia Neto The view that Pyrrhonism is not practically viable was, according to Richard H. Popkin, held during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuriesbydifferent philosophers suchas Mersenne,Arnauld, Pascal, Ramsay, and others.1 Among the anti-sceptics, this position was usually taken as an argument against Pyrrhonism. Popkin points out that Hume's main contribution to the "Pyrrhonian controversy" is to show that (i) "the (...) Pyrrhonian doctrine was the logical outcome of philosophical analysis,"2 (ii) that the infeasibility of Pyrrhonism does not weaken its epistemological force but only its psychological plausibility, and (Ui) that this implausibility obtains because nature (the common affairs ofeveryday life and the feeUngs, impressions, and ideas thereby generated) impels the philosopher to believe.3 Popkin alsomakes an allusion to the similaritybetweenHume and Pascal on this issue.4 In this paper I compare the dilemma posed by Pascal as apropaedeutic tofaith withthe "dangerous dilemma" alluded to, but avoided, by Hume in the conclusion of book 1 of the Treatise. The dilemma follows from (i) above. At a certain point in his epistemological enquiry the philosopher is forced tomake a hard choice between the quite disadvantageous alternatives: either to continue his philosophizing, which, leading to Pyrrhonism, may bring despair and cause the annihilation ofhis life, or to abandon philosophy, makinghim aprey ofthe "errors, absurdities, andobscurities"ofanon-critical life.5 In what follows I compare Hume's solution to this dilemma with Pascal's.? In the following passage Hume shows the toughness of the dilemma and offers a first answer to it: What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties? If we... condemn all refin'd reasoning, we run into the most manifest absurdities. If we reject it in favour of these reasonings, we subvert entirely the human understanding. We have, therefore, no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all. For my part, I know not what ought to be done Volume XVII Number 1 41 JOSE R.???? NETO in the present case. I can only observe what is commonly done; which is, that this difficulty is seldom or never thought of; and even where it has once been present to the mind, is quickly forgot, and leaves but a small impression behind it. (T 268) Note that in this first answer Hume manages to avoid the normative response that the dilemma demands. He provides, instead, a descriptive account which is a kind of solution because it purports to show that human psychology makes it unlikely that someone could reach the point at which he or she would have to choose between the two parties. The dilemma does not arise because nature stops the self-subversion ofreason. Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herselfsuffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent ofmind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. (T 269) Hume means by nature in this passage both human nature and the social and natural environments which, in so far as they demand specific reactions, generate appropriate beliefs. Those beliefs imposed by nature are necessaryforour survival. So, the mere interaction ofthe philosopher with the world outside his closet suffices to dispel his sceptical crisis. According to Hume, this determination of nature is absolute and necessary. "I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live... I may, nay I must yield to the current ofnature" (T 269). This view is reaffirmed in the Enquiry. Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a PYRRHONIAN may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point ofaction and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches.6 So, it would appear that the dilemma is just a fleeting impression in the imagination of the philosopher during a momentary sceptical crisis. Nature provides that such a crisis is not prolonged... (shrink)

O presente artigo aponta que tanto Lucrécio quanto Catulo entendem o amor passional como uma enfermidade, assim como coincidem nas descrições de tal doença em todas as suas etapas. O que é então que os separa? Onde está a confrontação entre eles? A resposta se encontra na atitude que cada um adota diante da enfermidade. Enquanto Lucrécio considera o amor passional como algo reprovável e que há de ser evitado ouvindo a razão, Catulo, ainda que esteja consciente dos efeitos negativos (...) deste tipo de amor, não pode evitar se entregar a ele. (shrink)

The wide and complex range of technologies produced and used in the contemporary societies has challenged the analysis from the different fields of social sciences. In this sense, in order to elaborate a study that aim at understanding the relationship between technological progress and the ongoing institutional changes that mark the capitalist societies, we believe it is necessary to adopt an interdisciplinary approach combining methodologies from Economics and Sociology fields. Therefore, this study proposes the development of an interdisciplinary dialogue between (...) the economic sociology of Pierre Bourdieu and the evolutionary economics developed by authors such as Giovanni Dosi, Sidney Winter, Richard Nelson and Bhaven Sampat. In doing so, we intend to demonstrate that a theory guided by Marx’s historical materialism, as it is the case of evolutionary economics, can be enriched by a materialist theory of symbolic, such as that of Pierre Bourdieu. In searching the comprehension of the complementarity between material and symbolic forces, this study addresses the conflictual process surrounding the formulation of the regulatory institutions to the biotechnology sector in Brazil over the last two decades. More precisely, through a case study, we seek to demonstrate that the convergence of discourses and interests between prestigious scientific organizations and the multinational companies that control the agrobiotechnology industry has been relevant to allow this new technological paradigm to make progress. Finally, we raise some questions concerning this alliance between business and science and the conflicts that revolve around the rapid expansion of the genetically modified crops worldwide. (shrink)

O acesso ao conhecimento, nomeadamente, através da educação e da formação, como agente de inclusão social e digital está na lista de prioridades de diversos organismos internacionais e a preocupação com grupos minoritários, como a população prisional é uma realidade incontornável. A este respeito a literatura também tem sido clara na demonstração de como a educação é fundamental para responder às necessidades daqueles que se encontram no limiar da exclusão social, em risco e vulnerabilidade. Este será um caminho para aumentar (...) a justiça social e reduzir a discriminação através da frequência de cursos de educação e formação. Neste texto procura-se fazer uma breve revisitação histórica da atividade educativa nos presídios em Portugal, com especial destaque para a recente iniciativa desenvolvida pela Universidade Aberta portuguesa, em parceria com a Direção Geral de Reinserção e Serviços Prisionais, relacionada com a criação do Campus Virtual Educonline@pris que se assume como uma academia de formação e educação digital. Pedagogicamente assente no modelo desta instituição apresenta-se, ainda, o desenho de um programa de formação que irá ser desenvolvido num presídio português de jovens adultos reclusos na área das competências e cidadania digital. (shrink)

A reconstrução racional do programa de pesquisa do racionalismo clássico sob a perspectiva da abordagem de solução de problemas.

This book is the first systematic account of Pierre Charron's influence among the major French philosophers in the period (1601-1662). It shows that Charron's Wisdom was one of the main sources of inspiration of Pierre Gassendi's first published book, the Exercitationes adversus aristoteleos. It sheds new light on La Mothe Le Vayer, who is usually viewed as a major free thinker. By showing that he was a follower of Charron, La Mothe emerges neither as a skeptical apologist nor as a (...) disguised libertine, as combatting superstition but not as irreligious. The book shows the close presence of Charron in the preambles of Descartes' philosophy and that the cogito is mainly based on the moral Academic self-assurance of Charron's wise man. This interpretation reverses the standard view of Descartes' relation to skepticism. Once this skepticism is recognized to be Charron's Academic one, it is seen not as the target but as the source of the cogito. Pascal is the last major philosopher for whom Charron's wisdom is crucially relevant. Montaigne and Descartes influenced, respectively, Pascal's view of the Pyrrhonian skeptic and of the skeptical main arguments. The book shows that Charron's Academic skeptical wise man is one of the main targets of his projected apology for Christianity, since he considered him as a threat and counter-example of the kind of Christian view of human beings he believed. By restoring the historical philosophical relevance of Charron in early modern philosophy and arguing for the relevance of Academic skepticism in the period, this book opens a new research program to early modern scholars and will be valuable for those interested in the history of philosophy, French literature and religion. (shrink)

This article examines the conception of scepticism during the early modern period. It describes how the writings of Pierre Charron and Michel de Montaigne inspired authors to search for a balance between extreme scepticism and what was often described as the dogmatism of the Schools. It discusses the revival of scepticism in the Renaissance and early seventeenth-century philosophy and shows the impact of Cartesian doubt in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century scepticism.

This paper has two sections. In the first one I examine Pascal's appropriation in La 131 of the Cartesian argument of the deceiver God. Pascal develops a skeptical reading of the argument in order to use it as a premise for his apologetic argument of true religion. In the second section I examine Huet's appropriation of this same Cartesian argument in his Philosophical Treatise on the Weakness of Human Understanding. Based on this work of Huet's and on his margin notes (...) on Pascal's Thoughts, I show that his skeptical reading of the argument is derived from Pascal's, although Huet's and Pascal's goals are distinct: while the latter intends to provide an argument for the Fall of Man, the former intends to show the weakness of reason unassisted by supernatural faith. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 11, November 2019, Page 1-8.

resumo Focado num trecho de “Position de L’inconscient”, este artigo faz a descrição gramatical das figuras de sujeito e de linguagem ali empregadas. A intenção é exclusivamente terapêutica – não se trata de propor novas teses, mas provocar o olhar para aspectos negligenciados da prática psicanalítica. palavras-chave Lacan - Wittgenstein - Linguagem - Subjetividade.

En este trabajo se estudian las iniciativas reformadoras del prelado sevillano Cristóbal de Rojas, que rigió la sede de Sevilla desde 1571 hasta 1580. Llegó a esta sede avalado por su larga experiencia en el gobierno de los obispados de Oviedo, Badajoz y Córdoba y por su conocimiento directo de los programas de reforma formulados en el Concilio de Trento, del que fue conciliar, y en el Concilio Provincial de Toledo de 1565-1566, que presidió por orden de Felipe II. En (...) esta obra se edita también su correspondencia con Felipe II sobre la vida cristiana en Sevilla. (shrink)